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Abstract
Nowadays, in societies threatened by atomization, selfishness, short-
term thinking, and alienation from political life, there is a renewed debate
about classical questions concerning the quality of democratic decision-
making. In this work a cellular automata (CA) model for the dynamics
of free elections based on the social impact theory is proposed. By us-
ing computer simulations, power law distributions for the size of electoral
clusters and decision time have been obtained. The major role of broad-
casted electoral surveys in guiding opinion formation and stabilizing the
“status quo” was demonstrated. Furthermore, it was shown that in soci-
eties where these surveys are manipulated within the universally accepted
statistical error bars, even a majoritary opposition could be hindered from
reaching the power through the electoral path.
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1 Introduction
During the last decades there has been a great interest in applications of sta-
tistical physics in social sciences [1, 2]. Indeed, inherently probabilistic so-
cial phenomena such as riots, wars, economic depressions, electoral landslides,
and collapses of governmental coalitions seems to exhibit self-organized critical-
ity [3]. A prime example is the observed scale-free distribution for the num-
ber of votes obtained by distinct candidates in the 1998 general elections in
Brazil [4]. Among a widely range of complex dynamical systems, two classi-
cal problems, namely, opinion formation and voting processes, essential to the
quality of democracy, received particular attention from physicists [5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
In particular, CA models of opinion formation in a society with a strong leader
1mmartins@mail.ufv.br
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showed clustering phenomena, homogenization, and hysteresis, as observed in
real social systems [5]. Furthermore, real-space renormalization methods ap-
plied to a simple model of voting process in hierarchical organizations revealed
the paradoxal result that democratic elections can lead to totalitarism [8].
One of the basic prerequisites for the democracy is the electoral dispute
for the power, characterized by free choices and a playfield at least moderately
equilibrated. So, democracy demands a wider access of the citizens to relevant
information, not only to the programs and proposals of the candidates, but
also to an evaluation of their chances in the political processes. In universes
marked by some electoral fragmentation and strong competitivity, it is reason-
able to assume that certain choices are made, through a strategic and complex
way, based on criteria that take into account both affinity and pragmatism at
different degrees. Electoral surveys represent an effective tool to provide the
informations needed to carry out similar political calculations. From the demo-
cratic standpoint, it is unacceptable that such possibility of evaluation should be
suppressed from the citizens, assert the republican tradition and the mass me-
dia. However, due to the allegated inductive power of the electoral surveys, the
citizens’ choices without them might take into account more authentic personal
convictions about the candidates and proposals, advocate some others.
This democratic controversy acquires a particular relevance in Latin Amer-
ica which, despite its poverty and inequalities, represents a huge market for the
mass media. Indeed, television networks reach more than 80% of the homes in
its most populated countries. Also, since in Latin America the reading tradition
is constrained to limited social segments, the contrast between television and
press is significantly greater than that observed in the developed world. More-
over, where the television is private and successful – as in Brazil and Mexico
–, it is either slavish to the government or totally irresponsible. Where the
television is public, it is influenced, propagandist and hardy accessible to the
political opposition. In these countries the monitoring mechanisms of campaign
advertisements and electoral surveys in the media are fragile or inexistent. Be-
sides, the people education levels in Latin American nations are in general low,
as was demonstrated by surveys carried out during the 1989 general elections in
Brazil, which revealed that almost 70% of the electors have only fundamental
education, if so.
In the present work, we report on the simulation results obtained via a CA
model designed to address basic issues concerning the effects of electoral surveys
on the dynamics of democratic voting. Specifically, the following questions were
investigated: 1. what role do electoral surveys play on the voting processes in
societies with different levels of education? 2. Under what conditions can the
“status quo” be preserved through subtle manipulations of the opinion formation
mechanisms? It is worth emphasizing that we do not expect to give definitive
answers to these questions or make predictions about any particular political
system. Instead, we believe that the results, obtained using algorithmic models
built upon precise hypotheses, simple dynamical variables and evolution rules,
can be used as plausibility probes relevant to the actual events. This is the way
CA or agent-based modeling can be effective tools to the advancement for the
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social sciences [2].
2 The model
The CA model consists of N = L2 electors distributed on the sites of a square
lattice with linear size L and periodic boundary conditions. Every voter i (i =
1, 2, . . . , N) can choose among one of three classical political options: left, center
or right, denoted as σi = 1, 2 and 3, respectively. In addition, each citizen has
an ideology ξi = −1 (left), 0 (center) or +1 (right), fixed in time. At each time
step, the political preferences σ of all the electors are simultaneously updated.
It is assumed, in agreement with the social impact theory [10], that the vote
intention of each elector is influenced by the opinions of the citizens on his
Moore neighborhood, including himself, and by an external field associated to
the results of electoral surveys. These effects are included in a deterministic
field Ii(t) used by every elector to make their political evaluations. The CA
rules used are the following:
Rule 1: An elector i subjected to a social impact Ii(t) updates his vote in-
tention σi with probability
νi =
|Ii(t)|
β + |Ii(t)|
, (1)
which describes the randomness affecting the process of individual opinion for-
mation. The parameter β measures the sensitivity to changes in the society.
Clearly, the citizen’s current vote intention is maintained, i. e., σi(t+1) = σi(t),
with the complementary probability 1− νi.
The probability νi is a sigmoid curve that saturates at the unity for large
values of Ii(t) and vanishes when the social impact is null. Therefore, the larger
is the social impact on the elector i, greater is the chance of this elector update
his preference.
Rule 2: The social impact Ii(t) determines the local political preference Vi(t)
evaluated by the elector i. The form of Ii(t) depends on the elector ideology and
is a function of the local information only.
For a leftist or rightist, Ii(t) is calculated through the expression:
Iexti (t) = αi(ξi)∆(t) + εi(ξi)ξi +
∑
k
Jk[δ3,σk(t) − δ1,σk(t)], (2)
with ξi = ±1. The first term corresponds to the effect of electoral surveys, with
α being the mass media inductive power over elector i and ∆ the survey result
(see rule 4). The second term represents the tendency of an individual to vote
according his political ideology, εi being his ideological strength. The last term
accounts for the social neighbors influence, each one with persuasive power Jk.
It considers only the net influence due to all the leftist and rightist neighbors.
So, a citizen to the left (or right) build his voting strategy comparing the local
persuasive power of his ideological group and that of the opposite extreme,
independently of his neighbors of center. If Iexti (t) < 0, the left tendency is
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locally majoritary and Vi(t) = −1. If I
ext
i (t) > 0 the right tendency dominates
and Vi(t) = +1. Finally, if I
ext
i (t) = 0, there is an equilibrium between the local
preferences to the political extremes, the social impact on elector i vanishes,
and his current vote intention σ is maintained according to rule 1.
In turn, an elector of center compare the social impact to the extreme Iexti (t),
given by eq.(2), with the local impact of the moderates
Ici (t) = αi(0)δ0,∆(t) + εi(0) +
∑
k
Jkδ2,σk(t) (3)
If Ici (t) > |I
ext
i (t)| then, as evaluated by the moderate elector i, the center
is majoritary, Ii(t) = I
c
i (t)−|I
ext
i (t)| and Vi(t) = 0. If I
c
i (t) < |I
ext
i (t)| then one
of the political extremes is majoritary, Ii(t) = I
ext
i (t) and Vi(t) = sign(Ii(t)).
Finally, if Ici (t) = I
ext
i (t) = 0, there is no social impact Ii(t) on elector i and,
according to rule 1, his current vote intention is maintained.
Rule 3: Vote intention update: (a) an elector of center assumes the local
majoritary preference indicated by Vi(t). (b) A leftist always votes for the left
unless the right becomes the local major tendency, case in which the elector
migrates to the center. Similarly, (c) a rightist votes for the right, migrating
to the center only if his evaluation of Vi(t) indicates the left as majoritary. In
mathematical terms, the rules (a), (b) and (c) can be written as
σi(t+ 1) =


1 + [1 + Vi(t)] div 2, if ξi = −1
2 + Vi(t), if ξi = 0
2 + [2 + Vi(t)] div 2, if ξi = +1
(4)
where div 2 is the integer division by 2.
It is worth noting that the CA dynamics try to minimize the conflict between
each elector and his social environment constituted by his neighbors and mass
media information. However, each citizen follows distinct strategies depending
on his political ideology. Electors of center vote with the majority, moving
either to the left or to the right if necessary. In contrast, since individuals at
the ideological extremes exhibit a limited motility in the political spectrum,
they cannot minimize this conflict. Indeed, if the right is the majoritary, the
leftist has a single political strategy: change his vote to the center, trying to
prevent the victory of his ideological enemy, and vice-versa.
Rule 4: Electoral surveys: periodically the total number of vote intentions to
left nl, center nc and right nr are counted. The greatest of these values defines
the electoral survey result: ∆ = −1 (left), ∆ = 0 center and ∆ = +1 (right).
Since the mass media does not necessarily represents a way towards a democratic
government, factors fl, fc and fr multiplying nl, nc and nr, respectively, can be
introduced in order to simulate possible manipulations of the electoral surveys.
Thus, the case fl = fc = fr = 1 corresponds to electoral surveys without bias,
whereas the set fl = 0.98, fc = 1, and fr = 1.02 introduces a bias to the right
within the accepted error bars for opinion surveys.
Exposed the CA rules, some additional comments about the features and
social interactions of the model are necessary. Differently from most of the pre-
vious opinion formation models, the present one does not involve binary choices
4
since, in general, electoral processes are not constrained to two political options
only. Clearly, this detail complicates the model because an Ising-like dynamics
is inappropriate. The model assumes that each elector has a bounded rational-
ity, i. e., does not have detailed global information and infinite computational
power. Also, as claimed by Althusser [11], the elector ideology acquires a ma-
terial character since it guides the actions (political calculations and eventual
choices) executed by each voter. It is evident that citizen’s political convictions
can evolve in time under the influence of multiple internal and collective factors.
However, this is typically a slow dynamics if compared to the periods of electoral
campaigns and thus it is reasonable to associate a fixed ideology to any voter.
At last, the relevance of the mass media is evident from the fact that it became,
above the parties and electoral systems, a major actor in actual contemporary
politic [12].
Concerning social couplings, the persuasive power J , ideological strength
ε, and susceptibility to mass media influence α are complex functions of the
elector’s ideology, as assumed in eqs. (2) and (3). Indeed, at the political
extremes there is some fraction of the electors that aggressively seeks to convince
(high J) while strongly resisting being influenced (low α, high ε). In contrast, it
is more probable that some moderate electors absorb information and experience
persuasion (high α, low ε) without seeking to influence their neighbors (low
J). In turn, the relative values of these parameters J , ε and α also depend
on highly complex psycological and social phenomena. In societies with low
education levels, decreasing political participation and where familiar, friendship
and aiding relationships predominate, as in Latin America, one might conjecture
an average value of J greater than that of ε. But, in moderate societies with
satisfactory levels of education, citizens’ openness to reasoned arguments, as in
Europe, again the value of J might be greater than ε in average. The opposite
may happen if the society is characterized by fanaticism, exclusivism or political
polarization. In summary, the interpretation of the model interactions J , ε and
α, as well as their relationship, in terms of the underlying psychological and
social phenomena is an open problem. Finally, the influence of mass media seems
to be greater in societies where education levels are low, political alienation is
high and the individualism dominates.
3 Simulational results
The initial CA configuration is composed of randomly distributed electors vot-
ing to the center, left and right with probabilities pl, pr and pc = 1− (pl + pc),
respectively. For the sake of simplicity, the same probabilities were indepen-
dently used to determine the fixed electors ideology ξk. At the beginning of
the simulations, the electors’ persuasive powers Jk and ideological strengths εk
were chosen, and fixed, from piecewise uniform probability distributions on the
unitary interval. Again, for simplicity, these distributions were assumed inde-
pendent of the voter’s ideology. The social sensitivity β = 10 and the average
value J = 0.5 for the persuasive power of the electors were fixed and distinct ε
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tested. The simulations were performed on a lattice of linear size L = 200 and
the results averaged over 200 independent samples.
The CA simulations have been implemented using the following procedure.
Specified the initial configuration, the result of the electoral survey is determined
according to rule 4. This result is fixed for T time steps until a next survey is
made. Then, all voters simultaneously evaluate, using rule 2, their local social
impact. According to rule 1, if the social impact on the elector i vanishes, his
vote intention is maintained. Otherwise (Ii(t) 6= 0), the voter i can update
his vote, with probability νi(t), applying rule 3. After visit all the electors,
a new time step begins and the entire procedure (electoral surveys at t = nT ,
n ∈ ℵ, evaluation of the social impact on each elector and application of the vote
update rules) is iterated. In the simulations a period T = 1 was used and thus,
since electoral surveys are often broadcasted weekly, a time step corresponds to
a week.
3.1 The ideological strength
Initially, the role of the ideological strength in a society free from the mass media
influence (α = 0) was analysed. Figure 1 shows the temporal evolution and
the stationary spatial distributions of vote intentions obtained from a random
initial configuration in which pl = 0.30, pc = 0.55, and pr = 0.15. As the system
evolves the electors aggregate in clusters sharing a common vote intention. For
small values of ε the majoritary group percolates the lattice, becoming less
dense and non-percolating as the value of ε increases. In Figure 2 it is shown
that, excluding the eventual percolating cluster, the cluster size distribution of
the majoritary groups obeys a power law, whereas for the minoritary political
groups an exponential decay can be observed. The exponents of the power
laws depend on the average ideological strength ε. The smaller ε is, greater
is the exponent and faster is the decay of the cluster size distribution for the
majoritary tendency. In contrast, the characteristic size of the exponentially
distributed minoritary aggregates seems to be independent of the ideological
strength. So, agreement clustering, indicating convergence of vote intention,
rises when ideological strength decreases.
The central role of the ideological strength is exhibited in Figure 3, in which
the society is initially polarized between the political extremes (majoritary
groups), the liberals (center) represent a minoritary fraction of the electorate,
and the vote intentions are built taking into account only the local interactions
among the individuals (α = 0). For a low ε, the conflict between the extremes
can be progressively resolved via an option to the center, as shown in Figure 3a.
This scenario is reminscent of the political affairs occurred in Portugal in 1974,
known as the Cravos’ revolution, in which the liberals and the extremes walk
rapidly towards a national political consensus of center [12]. In contrast, for a
high ε and, therefore, constrained possibilities of conciliation, democratic elec-
tions seems to be, as shown in Figure 3b, unable to overcome the polarization
between radically opposed tendencies. In such extreme situation it is often the
case that the solution for the political conflict arises from a rupture of the demo-
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Figure 1: Evolution in time of vote intentions to the left, center and right for
two distinct values of the average ideological strength (a) ε = 0.3 Ji (low) and
(b) ε = 1.8 Ji (high). The final (t = 200) spatial distributions of votes are
shown in (c) and (d), respectively. Black, white and gray pixels correspond to
vote intentions to the left, center and right. A random initial configuration in
which 30% of the electorate is composed by leftists, 55% are liberals and 15%
rightists was used. Ji = 0.5 and α = 0 (absence of mass media effects) were
fixed.
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Figure 2: Final (t = 200) cluster size distributions of electors sharing an equal
vote intention for the simulations considered in Figure 1. The (a) majoritary
group aggregate in clusters distributed according power laws, but the minority
(b) can cluster in groups exponentially distributed in size.
cratic process. A noticeable historical example for this scenario was provided
by the Spanish civil war [12]. Thus, in societies with high values of ε, danger-
ous situations of strong political polarization become more probable, since the
extremism or fanaticism prevents the spreading of convincing arguments. It is
often the case that the fanaticism can be dominant in populations with very
low education levels. However, there is no simple or linear relationship between
education level of the citizens and their ideological strength.
In Figure 4 it is shown the CA phase diagram for voting processes with-
out electoral surveys (α = 0). Since the leftists and rightists has a limited
motility in the political spectrum and the electors of center update their vote
intention according to the majoritary preference indicated by the local social
impact Ii(t), it is possible to an initial minority becomes majoritary at the end
of the electoral process. This possibility, i. e., the final victory of a minoritary
group, depends on the average value of the ideological strength and the initial
difference of vote intention between the initial majority and the largest minori-
tary groups. In order to demonstrate this possibility, several initial scenarios
in which the majority, center, and the largest minority, left, are separated by
a difference of vote intention ∆cl(0) were simulated. (Notice that there is a
perfect symmetry between left and right in the CA evolution rules.) Throught
these simulations the probability Pmin of an initial minoritary group wins the
election was estimated. As shown in Figure 4, the initial majority (center) wins
the election, with certainty Pmin = 1, if ∆cl(0) > ∆
∗, a critical value dependent
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Figure 3: Evolution in time of vote intentions as in Figure 1, but for an ini-
tial dangerous scenario of strong political polarization. In (a) ε = 0.1 Ji (low
ideological strength), and the voting process can resolve the impasse through a
liberal option, as occurred in Portugal’s revolution in 1974. In (b) ε = 1.7 Ji
(high ideological strength) and the polarization persists, often leading to a rup-
ture of the democratic regime as happened in Spanish civil war in 1936.
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Figure 4: Phase diagram for voting processes without electoral surveys (or mass
media influence α = 0). Two regions are observed: one in which the initial
majoritary tendency is the winner, and the other in which an initial minority
can win the elections. These two regions are separated by a sudden transition
line ∆∗(ε), determining the largest initial difference between the majoritary
and minoritary fractions of vote intention that can be reversed along the voting
process. The center is the initial majoritary group and the left is the greater
minority. Ji = 0.5, pr = 0.15 and 200 runs were used in order to evaluate the
probabilities of minoritary victory Pmin.
on ε. Otherwise, the minority (left) is the winner. As a result, in societies where
apathy, alienation and low education levels prevail, it is possible to a minority
attains the political power. Our simulations suggest that these two regions are
separated by a sudden transition. In contrast, if the center isthe minoritary
initial group, the minority never wins the elections.
Finally, in Figure 5 the distribution of decision time P (τ) is shown. τ is
the time each elector spent to change his vote intention and it is distributed
as a power law whose exponents decrease as the average ideological strength ε
increases. These results indicate that in populations alienated from political life
the electors change more rapidly and frequently their vote intention, as expected.
Such power laws for the decision time were also observed in the Sznajd model
of opinion formation [13] in which small sets of voters influence their nearest
neighbours if and only if all of them within the given set agree. However, for the
Sznajd model the exponents characterizing P (τ) have a constant value −3/2.
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Figure 5: Power law distributions for the decision time τ in societies with low
average ideological strength ε. τ is the time each elector spent to change his
vote intention and ε = 0.1 Ji = 0.05 was used.
Figure 6: Final (t = 200) spatial distributions of vote intentions in electoral
processes subjected to mass media influence (α = Ji = 0.5). In (a) ǫ = 0.3Ji
and in (b) ǫ = 1.8Ji,correponding to societies with low and high ideological
strenght, respectivelly. The remaining parameters used are the same of Figure
1. As can be noticed, the density of the majoritary group (in white) is largely
increased.
11
100 101 102 103 104 105
S
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
n
S
ε=0.15
ε=0.90
Figure 7: Cluster size distributions for the majoritary groups as in Figure 2a,
but subjected to the effects of electoral surveys (α = 4Ji = 2.0). As can be no-
ticed, there are percolating clusters (indicated by the arrow) and the remaining
isolated majority clusters have a sharper size distribution if compared to those
in Figure 2a.
3.2 The mass media influence
Here, the mass media influence (α 6= 0) on the dynamics of the democratic vot-
ing is analyzed. The stationary spatial distributions of vote intentions shown
in Figure 6 reveal that the density of the majoritary group is largely increased
as compared to its counterpart in Figure 1. Also, as shown in Figure 7, the
exponents describing the power law decays of the majoritary cluster size distri-
butions increase significantly for both small and large values of ε. So, outside
the larger percolating clusters, the remaining isolated clusters of the majoritary
tendency have a sharper distribution. Thus, agreement clustering rises and the
levels of political diversity fall sharply. Furthermore, for small ε the power law
decay for the time τ each elector spent to change his vote intention is governed
by greater exponents as compared to those for α = 0, meaning that the elec-
tors change more rapidly their vote intention in response to the mass media
influence. Summarizing, in all societies, from low to high ideological strength
ε, the electorate is susceptible to the effects of electoral surveys broadcasted
by the mass media. Clearly, these effects are larger in societies with small ε,
as evidenced by the faster power decay of both cluster size and decision time
distributions.
In consequence of increasing the agreement clustering, decreasing the levels
of political diversity and reducing the “volatility” of electors vote intention,
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Figure 8: Phase diagrams for voting processes with electoral surveys. α =
0.5Ji = 0.25 was used. The possibility of the victory of an initial minority falls
sharply if compared with the α = 0 case shown in Figure 4a.
the free flow of information concerning current public opinion via broadcasted
electoral surveys has a stabilizing effect on the political “status quo”. Indeed,
as shown in Figure 8, the CA phase diagram for the voting process changes
for α 6= 0: the possibility of victory of an initial minoritary group falls sharply
if compared with the α = 0 case (Figure 4). Moreover, the simulation results
indicate that beyond a given threshold value α∗ the chance of a minoritary
vitory vanishes. Indeed, for α = 2.0 the phase diagram in figure 4b reduces
to a flat surface Pmin = 0 everywhere. Thus, the social resistence to political
changes rises significantly when external interactions associated to mass media
information are allowed. In contrast, an electorate constrained to small group
interactions is more openness to collectively changing its political opinion by
diffusive-like propagation.
These results naturally lead to the issue: what are the effects on the voting
process of broadcast manipulated electoral surveys? In order to answer this
question, a scenario in which the left is majoritary, overcoming the center by
an initial difference in vote intention ∆lc(0), was simulated. As shown in Fig-
ure 9, the strategy of the minority (center) manipulate pool results —within
the universally accepted statistical error bars— in its own benefit produces a
paramount chance in the phase diagram of figure 4b. The region in which
the minority is successfull enlarges dramatically mainly in societies where the
average ideologycal strength ǫ is small. Indeed, where the minoritary victory
was impossible before (Pmin = 0), now the victory is a certainty if the initial
13
Figure 9: Phase diagram for voting processes with manipulated electoral sur-
veys. The parameters are α = Ji = 0.5, fc = 1.04, fl = 0.98 and fr = 0.98,
which introduce a bias towards the center at the expense of the extremes. The
effects are impressive since the region where the initial minority wins is non-
vanishing. So, by manipulating electoral surveys, it is possible to hinder a
majoritary opposition reaches the power through the electoral path.
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difference in vote intention pro left is small then around 10%. The reason is
that, since the diffusive spread of arguments is difficult because the voters are
unable to sustain their arguments (small ε), populations with low education
levels and/or significative political alienation are more susceptible to external
influences reinforcing the weight of a particular group. So, by manipulating the
electoral surveys, it is possible in these societies to hinder a majoritary oppo-
sition reach the power through the electoral path. In Latin America, where
representative democracy was almost always deprived of meaning, manipulated
electoral surveys seems to be the rule. Such unscrupulous political strategies
are promptly justified: any “informed” people can not support a comunist or
revolutionary government, elected or not [14]
4 Conclusions
A stochastic cellular automata model for the dynamic of democratic voting
processes have been studied through computer simulations. In the model, each
voter updates his vote intention according to distinct political strategies which
depend on his own ideology (left, center or right) and the social impact affecting
him. The social impact includes the interactions between every elector and his
social neighbours, his ideological strength or capacity to sustain his choices, and
the influence of mass media through the broadcast of electoral surveys.
Starting from initial disordered configurations, progressive political agree-
ment clustering as well as complex changes in vote intention, characterized by
power law distributions for the size of electoral clusters and decision time, have
been obtained. In the absence of mass media influence, societies with small ide-
ological strength, maybe associated to low education levels and/or high political
alienation, exhibit smaller agreement clustering and higher diversity, allowing
that dangerous situations of strong political polarization can be resolved through
the voting process. In contrast, since the extremism or fanaticism prevents the
spreading of convincing arguments, greater agreement clustering, smaller diver-
sity and persisting dangerous polarizations are observed in societies with high
ideological strength.
A central result of this work is the demonstration that electoral surveys play a
major role in guiding opinion formation and stabilizing the “status quo”. Indeed,
the possibility of victory of an initial minoritary group falls sharply if compared
to the case where these surveys are absent. Moreover, in societies where these
surveys are manipulated within the universally accepted statistical error bars,
even a majoritary opposition can be hindered to reach the power through the
electoral path. Finally, societies with low ideological strengths revealed more
susceptible to the mass media influence, whereas societies with higher ε are
unable to resolve dangerous polarization events. Therefore, the model suggests
that the most desirable balance among agreement clustering, diversity levels
and low susceptibility to mass media influences seems to be exhibited in the
mid-range of ideological strength.
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